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Introduction
Most people, at least in the West, agree that the rule of law, which can be defined as the subordination of any government power to well-defined and established laws, is desirable. It is often interpreted as the basis of predictable and fair state action, which in turn is conducive to economic development. Not surprisingly, many development organizations have tried to promote the establishment and preservation of the rule of law in various parts of the world -thus far with rather mixed results.
Given this enthusiasm for the rule of law, it is remarkable how little we know about it.
This pertains not only to its effects, but also to its relationship with the political system and to its root causes. The relationship between the rule of law and democracy has been discussed on a theoretical level for a long time. 3 Barro (1999) , for example, failed to provide evidence that the rule of law and democracy are causally linked. Rigobon and Rodrik (2005) , in contrast, find some evidence that they are mutually reinforcing.
Improving our knowledge of the rule of law presupposes the ability to measure it. To date, the available rule of law indicators suffer from a number of serious conceptual flaws. This is why a new indicator is developed here. We follow the proposal for such an indicator in Voigt (2012) . It is based on a rather "thin" conception of the rule of law and a limited number of theoretically derived dimensions. Data produced by the World Justice Project (WJP, see Botero and Ponce 2011), which reflects the actual situation in the countries included, is used to analyze the association between these different dimensions and to measure the rule of law in aggregate. Drawing on our newly developed indicator, we ask whether different levels of rule of law are associated with different levels of democracy as well as different types of political regimes. Following standard practice, we distinguish parliamentary, semi-presidential, and presidential democracies. We find that on average parliamentary systems reach significantly higher levels of the rule of law than presidential systems. Also, among autocratic countries, a small number of monarchies perform surprisingly well in terms of the rule of law.
Although democracies (when all three subgroups are factored together) outperform autocracies overall, this is not the case for the subgroup of presidential democracies. This paper also investigates the long-term determinants of the rule of law. The development community seems to agree that attempts to export democracy have been, by and large, a failure (Andrews 2013 and Coyne 2007 are just two recent examples).
Nevertheless, there is still much money spent on trying to implement the rule of law in many regions of the world. The World Bank alone spends hundreds of millions of dollars annually on such projects. To better evaluate the prospects of being successful in such an endeavor, it is essential to understand why some countries were able to implement and safeguard the rule of law, while others are merely ruled by law. This is closely linked to questions about the fundamental causes of long-run growth. Both democracy and various aspects of the rule of law are considered by some scholars to be determinants of differences in income (see Acemoglu et al. 2014 for the effect of democracy on income, and Rigobon and Rodrik 2005 for the causal relationships between income, democracy and rule of law). Instead of directly addressing the complex identification problems arising in the analysis of the interrelationship between income levels and the rule of law, we focus on a more basic question: Given the strong association between income and the rule of law, which of the fundamental determinants of income can also be linked to modern-day rule of law levels?
Our findings suggest that certain determinants of long-run development operate via the rule of law, whereas others are not related to the rule of law at all. Specifically, the geographical characteristics of a country are strongly associated with both income and the rule of law. The institutional landscape has also been altered by European settlements, causing formerly prosperous areas to experience relative economic decline.
Our empirical evidence is not, however, merely supportive of the "primacy of institutions" view. Since human capital, which European settlers brought to their colonies, played an important role in historical economic development, too, it is also compatible with the "primacy of education" view. Finally, our results indicate that the rule of law does significantly contribute to economic development and it is not simply a consequence of high income levels.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our new rule of law indicator. Section 3 discusses potential complementarities and tradeoffs between the rule of law and democracy and analyzes them empirically by drawing on the newly developed indicator. Section 4 deals with potential roots of the rule of law, and Section 5 concludes.
A New Rule of Law Indicator
The renewed interest in the rule of law has been accompanied by a supply of indicators purporting to measure the rule of law. So why would we need to produce yet another one? It has been convincingly argued that some of the most frequently used indicators suffer from serious flaws. As an example, consider the dimension "rule of law" produced as part of the Worldwide Governance Indicators by a team originating from the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 2010) . 4 It is not only among the most frequently used indicators of the rule of law, but probably also the most criticized. The main critique is that the indicator is not based on a thoughtfully systematized concept, but that its (implicit) definition is based on surveys that happened to be available when the indicator is produced. 5 Consequently, it is unclear if this indicator really captures the quintessence of the rule of law or whether it is driven by some non-essential components.
Conceptualizing and Measuring the Rule of Law
It is not surprising that a concept like the rule of law has been delineated in a myriad of ways. We propose to rely on a rather "thin" (narrow, formal) instead of a "thick" (broad, substantive) conception here. 6 Whereas the thin version contains only the bare necessities, a thick version may contain other desirable traits, such as democracy or a broad set of human rights. We choose to delineate the rule of law rather thinly here because an all-encompassing definition of the rule of law would be unworkable for both empirical research and policy advice. To be as clear as possible about our conceptualization of the rule of law, we name some concepts that are better kept apart from it: (1) democracy, (2) market economy, (3) broadly defined human rights, (4) law and order, and (5) the degree to which citizens respect formal legislation. 7 To give the various dimensions of the rule of law a structure, we propose to distinguish between formal traits that legislation should have, and instruments that are used to ensure the proper implementation of such legislation. These instruments include, among other things, the separation of powers, judicial independence, and a narrowly defined set of basic human rights which include the absence of extrajudicial killings, torture, and the like.
Focusing on the formal traits of legislation, Hayek (1960, 164) points out that the rule of law is often contrasted to the rule of man. The concept is sometimes called "government 4
Other popular rule of law indicators are provided by Freedom House or as part of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index and the International Country Risk Guide. 5
We are deliberately brief here because there is an extensive debate of the indicator's weaknesses. Among the critics are Arndt and Oman (2006) , Knack (2006) , Langbein and Knack (2010) , Thomas (2010) , as well as Kurtz and Schrank (2007) . Kaufmann et al. (2007) is a reply to critics. 6
The distinction between thin and thick concepts is commonly used in the literature on the rule of law. HiiL (2007) is but one example. 7
The reasons for separating these concepts from the rule of law are spelled out in some detail in Voigt (2012) .
under the law" because the law is to be applied equally to everyone, political leaders included. According to the rule of law, no power used by government may be arbitrary;
all power has to be limited. Furthermore, drawing on Immanuel Kant (1797/1995) laws should fulfill the criterion of universalizability, which has been interpreted as the law being general, i.e., applicable to an unforeseeable number of persons and circumstances, open, i.e., not prescribing a certain behavior but simply proscribing a finite number of actions, and certain, i.e., anyone interested in discovering whether a certain behavior is legal can do so with a fairly high chance of being correct and can furthermore expect that today's rules will also be applied tomorrow.
Lon Fuller's (1969, 44-91) Storrs Lectures contain a famous list of traits that rules should have. All of these can be interpreted as describing necessary components of the rule of law. According to Fuller's list, laws must be (1) general, (2) publicly promulgated, (3) prospective (i.e., not retroactive), (4) clear, (5) consistent (i.e., not contain any contradictions), (6) practicable (i.e., not demand the impossible), (7) constant over time, and (8) congruent with the actions of officials. 8
To measure both the formal traits of legislation as well as the means by which they are implemented, a number of issues need to be addressed. If we assume that the effects of the rule of law depend on the degree to which those traits are implemented, it is necessary to identify measures for actual practice-and not just for some black letter law, as in Nardulli et al. (2013) . This implies that the variables used to produce our rule of law indicator should reflect the actual behavior of law enforcers. These include the bureaucracy, police, prosecutors, judges, prison staff, and others. 9 Such behavior can usually only be measured based on evaluations by experts or the general population, which are of course to some degree subjective.
Proponents of objective data and those of subjective data emphasize different pros and cons of such institutional indicators (see, e.g., Gutmann et al. 2014) . The main argument in favor of objective data is (given precisely defined underlying criteria) the variable is free from subjective evaluations, which might (particularly in a cross-country context) hugely diverge between respondents. The main argument in favor of subjective data is that many decisions are based on various hard and soft criteria that can never be comprehensively covered by a limited number of objectively measurable facts. For 8 Buchanan and Congleton (1998) is a description of both the rationale as well as the ensuing desirable traits of legislation that economists will find very accessible. 9 Glaeser et al. (2004) might reply that this confounds institutional constraints and political decisions. However, if one is interested in enforced institutions, the effectiveness of law cannot be taken for granted.
example, the investment climate of a country is the result of a number of considerations that can only enter into subjective variables. For practical reasons, measuring the de facto rule of law objectively is not a feasible option at this time.
Creating Nested Indicators for the Rule of Law
We now move on to describe the operationalization of the different dimensions of the rule of law explicitly taken into consideration here. A framework for how to measure the rule of law has been spelled out in detail by Voigt (2012) . Here we use and amplify this framework, which makes a distinction between the quality of legal norms and the quality of their enforcement with respect to the rule of law. Indicators for the rule of law have until now exclusively measured the latter (Bergman 2012). In the following, we introduce the dataset we draw on for measuring both aspects and explain our procedure for aggregating the variables of interest into nested rule of law indicators.
The WJP uses a number of survey instruments with more than 400 questions in total.
These were administered between 2011 and 2013 in 99 countries worldwide. Over 100,000 households and 2,400 experts were surveyed. 10 Making use of all available data would, of course, be an option. However, we pursue a more conservative strategy here and rely only on survey items that conceptually fit well into one of the dimensions that we argue are essential to the rule of law. By excluding those questions that do not fit well, we create eleven components, which reflect different dimensions of the rule of law and are based on varying numbers of survey items. 11 In total, we use 91 questions from the WJP survey. For the dimension "prosecutorial independence", we have identified just one question that can serve as an adequate proxy. At the other end of the spectrum, the dimensions "universalizability of the law" and "discrimination free judiciary" are each addressed by 14 different questions. Appendix 1 displays the survey questions we use, organized according to our eleven dimensions of the rule of law. The general population survey is translated into local languages, adapted to common expressions, and administered by leading local polling companies using a probability sample of 1,000 respondents in the three largest cities of each country. 11 "Prosecutorial accountability" and "judicial review of legislation" are two additional dimensions we would like to take into account, but they have not been measured at all.
opponents of the political regime more harshly. Finally, "impartiality in law enforcement" depends on whether the law is applied equally and independently of wealth, gender, ethnicity, etc. of the parties to the dispute. Although these three categories lay emphasis on different dimensions in the realization of the rule of law, there is, of course, some conceptual overlap between them. Nevertheless, our four subindicators reflecting each of these categories may be conducive to identifying more precisely if and how countries fail to uphold the rule of law. A country may, for example, hold its politicians accountable to the law, but at the same time discriminate systematically against minorities. Also, a perception of significant external or internal threats to a country may motivate limitations on the standards applied in law enforcement.
Figure 1: Structure of the Rule of Law Indicator
We compute our eleven components as the mean score of the respective constituent variables, which were coded by the WJP (see Botero and Ponce 2011). These variables are all scaled between zero and one with higher values indicating more de facto rule of law. To make sure that by taking the mean over many different variables we do not confound dissimilar information in one component, we also run factor analyses for each group of variables. In all dimensions a single latent factor covers most of the underlying variation in the data, which is supported by the respective scree plots. However, in the dimension "universalizability" we find that a second factor explains more than 20 percent of the variation in the answers to 14 questions. The first factor, which by itself explains over 70 percent of the variation, loads highly on the eleven questions from the expert surveys, whereas the second factor loads highly on the remaining three questions 
Universalizability
We attribute 14 questions from the WJP to the dimension universalizability. They cover aspects such as the public availability of laws, their timely publication, the stability of regulation over time as well as the awareness citizens have regarding their rights. The variables reflect many aspects in Fuller's (1969) list, which was described above.
Checks on the Executive
The separation of powers allocates specific powers to specific branches of government, thus diluting the power of each branch and making transgressions against the law less likely. Here we draw on three questions referring to the degree to which the executive is effectively constrained by the legislature and judiciary.
Judicial Independence
If the judiciary is not independent, there will be a government of men, not a government of laws. Judicial independence implies that judges can expect their decisions to be implemented, regardless of whether they are in the (short-term) interest of other government branches upon which implementation depends. 13 In case of conflict between citizens and the government, the citizens need an organization that can adjudicate impartially. We draw on nine questions from the WJP survey instrument.
They deal with the independence from the government of different courts, undue influence by the government in court proceedings, and the prospects for implementation of court decisions.
12
Mean scores are employed here instead of factor scores to avoid loss of information as a consequence of missing observations in single variables. Alternatively, we could perform imputation before the calculation of factor scores. However, using mean scores is in line with the procedure by which the WJP aggregates their data. 13
It further implies that judges need not fear negative consequences as a result of their decisions, such as (a) being expelled, (b) being paid less, or (c) being made less influential.
Judicial Accountability
Of course, the judiciary should also not be unconstrained; it must be limited to interpreting the law, and not be allowed to bend it. It thus needs to be held accountable, just as the other branches of government. Completely unconstrained judges might take too long to render a decision, ignore certain evidence, base a decision on irrelevant legislation, or simply make a patently false decision. Thus, independent judges can be a prerequisite for the rule of law, but also a threat to it. Until now, most measures of judicial accountability were highly questionable. The WJP, however, provides two variables addressing the accountability of judges: Is abuse of power by judges being sanctioned and are decisions published in a timely manner?
Prosecutorial Independence
One precondition for implementation of the rule of law is that similar cases are treated similarly. If governments can influence who is prosecuted and in what way, the rule of law suffers. Governments could act to keep certain crimes from being prosecuted and at other times call for the prosecution of crimes never committed. There is one variable by the WJP inquiring specifically into the lack of independence of prosecutors. Together with the independence and accountability of judges and different checks on the executive this falls into our broader category of "checks and balances".
Procedurally Fair Trials and 7. Procedures for Imprisonment
The WJP survey instrument contains a number of questions that can be used to create a component regarding the prospect for a fair trial. We choose 13 different questions covering aspects as diverse as the length of pre-trail detention, the presumption of innocence, access to evidence used against suspects, the likelihood of arbitrary arrest, and others. In addition, we create another component that summarizes the likelihood of being imprisoned without an indictment or formal charges based on three questions.
Basic Human Rights
It is unconceivable that even a minimum level of the rule of law can coexist with systematic disappearances, torture, extralegal killings, and so forth. We therefore integrate the absence of such atrocities in our measure of the rule of law. Based on eleven questions from the WJP we construct a component for basic human rights. This constitutes, together with the two previous components, our new subindicator for "standards in law enforcement".
Corruption Free Judiciary and 10. Corruption Free Law Enforcement
The final three components we create deal with different facets of "impartiality in law enforcement". When judges and court personnel are corrupt, the outcome of cases depends on the financial means of the involved parties. The resulting inequity in the enforcement of law is in stark contrast with the principles of the rule of law. We aggregate ten questions from the WJP survey regarding corruption in different types of courts in our component for judicial corruption. An analogous component is constructed for corruption in law enforcement, which focuses mainly on prosecutors and the police.
Discrimination Free Judiciary
Finally, discrimination in legal proceedings due to the gender, nationality, sexual orientation, religion, ethnicity or the wealth of a person is irreconcilable with the rule of law. Our component measures the prevalence of such forms of negative discrimination in both criminal and civil cases based on 14 expert survey questions.
<< Table 1: Correlation Matrix of the Main Dimensions of the Rule of Law >>
Having calculated the mean scores for our 11 components of the rule of law, we can proceed with aggregating the data further. Cronbach's (1951) α, which is reported in Appendix 1 for each component of the rule of law, indicates high levels of reliability.
Next, we aggregate the components in three subindicators for the enforcement of the rule of law: "checks and balances," "standards in law enforcement," and "impartiality in law enforcement" by calculating mean scores. The correlations among these subindicators and that for "universalizability" range from r=0.79 to r=0.88. They are displayed in Table 1 . In our overall indicator for the rule of law, the quality of law and the enforcement of law are weighted equally. It is thus a weighted sum of the four subindicators with "checks and balances," "standards in law enforcement," and "impartiality in law enforcement" each given one third of the weight of the subindicator for "universalizability". When we compare our rule of law indicator to that of the World Bank, we find a correlation of 0.95. This suggests that in spite of all the criticism, the Worldwide Governance Indicators might not be that wide off the mark in measuring the rule of law. Nevertheless, both indicators are not exactly identical and the World Bank's indicator is rather determined by the enforcement of the rule of law than by the substance of the law. Appendix 2 lists the rule of law scores.
Our rule of law indicator shows marked differences between countries. The highest rule of law levels can be observed in the Scandinavian countries, including Finland. The worst performing country is clearly Venezuela, followed by Zimbabwe, Uganda and war-torn Afghanistan. Singapore on rank ten is the best-performing autocracy, even ahead of the United States, which is ranked twentieth. By and large, these results accord well with our intuition. Observing these differences in realized rule of law levels leads to the next question we want to deal with: how to explain them?
The following section first addresses the question of whether the implementation of the rule of law should be considered as a concomitant effect of the adoption of political rights, which has already been studied extensively (see, e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Gassebner et al. 2013; Gleditsch and Ward 2006) , or whether it is a largely independent phenomenon.
Democracy, Regime Type, and the Rule of Law
If the rule of law was understood as a by-product that follows the extension of the voting franchise and other political rights, we could simply draw on the existing literature concerned with endogenous democracy to explain variation in the rule of law. This is certainly not the place to summarize the long and still ongoing debate about the relationship between the rule of law and democracy (see, e.g., Maravall and Przeworski 2003). However, it has become clear with the diffusion of democracy around the world that the rule of law does not always come on its heels. Zakaria (2003) , for example, has condemned the detrimental track record of many "illiberal democracies", which (in contrast to liberal democracies) mix elections with authoritarianism, often ignoring minority rights and failing to implement effective constraints on executive power. He further argues that most Western countries had adopted the rule of law long before becoming democratic. This account of history and politics would suggest that the rule of law is a phenomenon worth studying independently of the political system of a country.
Mukand and Rodrik (2015) evaluate the arguments of Zakaria (2003) and others by formally modeling the emergence of liberal versus illiberal democracy. In their gametheoretical political economy model three factions (economic elite, majority and minority) are in conflict over the adoption of three sets of rights in the constitution (property rights, political rights, and civil rights). The economic elites prefer strong property rights in order to be shielded from expropriation by the majority. The majority favors extensive political rights, which would allow them to decide over the provision of public goods. The provision of public goods would be to the detriment of the minority, unless they are protected against discrimination via strong civil rights. This conception of civil rights, which Mukand and Rodrik link to liberalism, is closely aligned with our understanding of the rule of law. It should not come as a surprise that, according to their model, most of today's democracies are electoral, not liberal democracies. While democratization entails the exchange of political rights for property rights, this is not the case for civil rights. As the provision of civil rights is costly for the majority and not important for the economic elites, a political bargain between these two groups will tend to favor illiberal over liberal democracy. Liberal democracy would only emerge where the minority has relatively large bargaining power in the constitution-making process.
Mukand and Rodrik point out that the distinction between both majority and minority Given that democracies exhibit higher rule of law scores, we might ask whether particular types of democracies and autocracies stand out in that respect. Differences between presidential and parliamentary democracies regarding aspects of the rule of law have, for example, been discussed without any clear conclusion (see Persson et al. 1997 Persson et al. , 2000 Robinson and Torvik 2013) . In conclusion, the rule of law is associated with but not predetermined by a country's political institutions. It is more closely associated with the protection of property rights.
This could be explained, for example, if minority group and economic elite frequently coincide. In the next section, we inquire into what it is that determines the differences in rule of law levels we observe between countries if not the political system of a country.
Determinants of the Rule of Law
As a first step, we regress the rule of law indicator on a number of contemporary, but stable country characteristics that have been linked to the rule of law in the literature. It is well known that societies highly fractionalized by ethnicity, religion or language face a number of serious challenges -lower rule of law levels and more corruption being two of them (Easterly and Levine 1997) . It is also often argued that the common law reduces legislators' discretionary power (Glaeser and Shleifer 2002) . This would make the law more stable over time and, hence, more predictable for its users. Others argue that the judiciary is systematically more independent in common law countries (La Porta et al. frequently mentioned as determinants of the rule of law are not significantly correlated with our index. Second, the rule of law is so closely related to long-run economic development (and thus modern-day income levels) that it might not be possible to understand the evolution of the rule of law without looking more closely into these longrun paths of development. In the following, we will use established fundamental causes of economic development to explain differences in rule of law levels across countries. If we find that all of these fundamental causes are associated in the same way with the rule of law as they are associated with income, we cannot rule out any of the three explanations above.
However, such a result would be a natural consequence under the assumption that "explanation 2" is the most accurate description of the relationship between rule of law and income. If, in contrast, we find that the rule of law is only associated with some of the determinants of long-run development and the causal link between these fundamental causes and income runs according to theory via institutional quality, this would clearly support an important role of "explanation 1". In this sense, our analysis is not only relevant for understanding possible deep roots of the rule of law, but it might also shed light on one central transmission channel to long-run economic development. Similar questions have been addressed by Acemoglu et al. (2008 Acemoglu et al. ( , 2014 for the relationship between income and democracy.
In the following, we replicate the work by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013, hereafter S&W) , which provides a unified empirical framework for studying the roots of long-run economic development. We use the same estimation strategy, explanatory variables and data as S&W, but replace their dependent variable -log income per capita -with our indicator for the rule of law. To improve the comparability of our results with those of S&W, we also replicate their exact regression models, only reducing the number of observations to the sample covered by our rule of law indicator. These results can be found in Appendix 2. The most important potential causes of current income levels include geography, the quality of institutions, and the ancestral composition of current populations. As indicated above, our analysis can shed light on one of the key questions raised by S&W: "Through what specific mechanisms do long-term geographic and historical factors affect outcomes today?" (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2013:326) . (2002) demonstrate that former European colonies experienced a reversal of fortune after 1500.
<<
For the whole world, wealth in 1500 proxied by population density is uncorrelated with modern-day income levels. This masks two opposing effects in specific sub-samples. European settlers was more critical for economic development than were the institutions they brought with them.
The first column of Table 6 illustrates that the rule of law is indeed more developed where the share of descendants of Europeans in the population is larger. However, the result in column 2, after all countries with a population share of over 30 percent European descendants are dropped from the regression sample, is markedly different from the result of S&W. When European descendants constitute only a small share of the population, their marginal effect on income is more than twice as large as for the sample including all countries. In contrast, we find no significant marginal effect of European descendants on the rule of law when they are a clear minority. In other words, S&W find a marginally decreasing effect on income, whereas our results suggest a marginally increasing effect of Europeans on the rule of law. This is not surprising,
given that Europeans were likely to bring inclusive institutions specifically to sparsely populated regions where they were planning to settle in large numbers. The fact that countries less populated by European descendants profit even more from an increase in the number of descendants, in spite of not necessarily getting better institutions, might be more in line with the human capital argument of Glaeser et al. (2004) than with the institutions hypothesis of Acemoglu et al. (2001) . This does not, however, rule out that both human capital and institutions played an important role and it can be shown that "the relationship between economic development today and the proportion of Europeans during colonization vanishes when controlling for a measure of current human capital or a measure of government quality, which are consistent with the views that human capital and political institutions are intermediating channels" (Easterly and Levine 2012:4) . Sometimes, the rule of law has been criticized as an embodiment of Western thinking (Huntington 1993). What our results show is that there is, indeed, a relationship between Europeans and the degree to which the rule of law is realized.
Easterly and Levine (2012) are extending a model by Putterman and Weil (2010) , which is interested in the historical legacy of populations from specific geographic locations (versus the direct effect of these locations). Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 add the two indicators of early development by Putterman and Weil. The weighted number of years that has passed since the introduction of agriculture in the regions from where the population originates has a negative effect on the rule of law that is only significant at the 10 percent level. In the original regression by S&W, an early Neolithic revolution had a significant positive effect on income that was transmitted through the population and not the location itself. However, the effect on income already becomes insignificant when the sample size is reduced to match our rule of law regression sample (see Table   6B in Appendix 2).
Putterman and Weil (2010) find a trend in the results for the effect of state history on income that is comparable to that for the adoption of agriculture. State history only explains contemporary development when it is measured as the weighted average of the places in which the current residents' ancestors lived. Although the state history indicator can predict significant differences in income, even when the sample size is reduced, it is only significant at the 10 percent level once the rule of law is the dependent variable. In conclusion, the evidence is supportive of the rule of law being a potential link between an ancestry-adjusted long history of centralized government and contemporary income levels. Putterman and Weil (2010) themselves provide evidence that ancestry-adjusted state history increases executive constraints, property rights, government effectiveness and trust. However, the effect of an ancestry-adjusted early adoption of agriculture on the rule of law is if anything negative. This finding certainly deserves further inquiry, especially as it seems difficult to reconcile with the work by Ashraf and Galor (2011).
<< Table 7 : Genetic Distance to the US and Rule of Law >> Table 7 The additional barriers raised by differences in traits across populations may simply not be sufficient to significantly shape the diffusion of institutional innovation. The inventions of the industrial revolution might therefore have more easily diffused than, for example, the ideas of liberalism, which have formed a basis for the rule of law.
Another explanation for our null finding is that the US might not be the adequate technological frontier country from which the rule of law would diffuse. Our results to this point indicate that the diffusion of the rule of law presupposes population movements that transfer these institutions and it is not sufficient to have low cultural barriers between populations to encourage the adoption of these institutions.
<< Table 8 : Geography and Rule of Law II >>
In Table 8 , we extend upon the analysis of S&W by testing for the influence of three additional geographic country characteristics. First, we add an indicator by Nunn and Puga (2012) for terrain ruggedness to the baseline model. S&W also discuss the underlying argument: While ruggedness has a negative global effect on income, it has a positive local effect in Africa, where it historically stood in the way of slave trade. We find a negative but insignificant effect of ruggedness on the rule of law in a sample of 94 countries. When we include an Africa dummy and its interaction term with ruggedness in column 2, we find that ruggedness is associated with lower rule of law, but only in Africa. The marginal effect calculated by the delta method is -0.06 and it is significant at the 5 percent level. Jimenez-Ayora and Ulubaşoğlu (2015) have also found only a weak association between ruggedness and rule of law. When we estimate the same model with income per capita as the dependent variable, we find no significant effect in Africa, but a negative effect outside Africa, although only significant at the 10 percent level.
Next, we add an indicator by Easterly (2007) for the abundance of land suitable for growing wheat relative to that suitable for growing sugarcane, which Bennett and
Nikolaev (2015) argue is linked to income inequality via its effect on the rule of law.
The effect on the rule of law in column 3 is indeed positive, but only significant at the 10 percent level. Finally, we control for ancestry-adjusted traditional plough use in agriculture, which we instrument by the suitability of geo-climatic conditions for growing plough-positive or plough-negative cereals. Alesina et al. (2013) have linked plough use to more conservative gender norms and less female participation in politics and the economy. We also find a negative association with rule of law levels in column 4, which is however not statistically significant. Taken together, our results in Table 8 do not hint at any important geographic determinants of the rule of law that would have been neglected in the study by S&W.
Conclusion and Outlook
Our brief and very general analysis of possible roots of the rule of law follows the empirical approach of Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) closely. The results presented here already contain some interesting insights. Nevertheless, more research is warranted. We have, for example, not incorporated the potential role of culture for the adoption of the rule of law (see, e.g., Licht et al. 2007 ).
Considered as a whole, our results confirm some of the main findings in the deep roots of development literature and they shed some light on the rule of law as a transmission channel to economic growth. Geographical factors have an impact on the rule of law.
However, where countries were colonized, a reversal of fortune took place and previously rich areas were given extractive institutions and only limited human capital, which led to their relative economic decline. Many of the results from the literature claiming that institutions matter can be confirmed. Europeans settled in large numbers in less densely populated areas and brought their human capital and inclusive institutions with them. In more densely populated areas, settlers did not develop large-scale settlements, but tended to install extractive institutions. The rule of law scores for these areas did not benefit from a larger number of Europeans, they did, however, benefit in terms of economic development. This suggests that both institutions (as argued by Acemoglu et al. 2001 Acemoglu et al. , 2002 , and human capital (see Glaeser et al. 2004 ) have played a significant role in historical economic development.
Other factors, which have been important for historical economic development, are not associated with higher rule of law levels. The timing of the transition from a huntergatherer economy to agricultural and pastoral production and state antiquity are not related to contemporaneous rule of law levels. The genetic distance to the US, which is negatively associated with income (supposedly because it acts as a barrier to the diffusion of innovation) is also unrelated to rule of law levels. Institutions and human capital, it seems, should be transmitted via population movements and cannot simply be copied. This has been proven in many unsuccessful attempts at institutional transplantation (see Berkowitz et al. 2003) . Finally, the fact that the rule of law is only associated with those determinants of long-run development for which theory ascribes a significant role of institutions indicates that the rule of law does significantly contribute to economic development, nor is it only a consequence of high income levels. 
